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Abstract
In this work we study the problem of secure communication over a fully quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker channel. The
best known achievability rate for this channel model in the classical case was proven by Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter
in [2]. We generalize the result of [2]. One key feature of the results obtained in this work is that all the bounds
obtained are in terms of error exponent. We obtain our achievability result via the technique of simultaneous pinching.
This in turn allows us to show the existence of a simultaneous decoder. Further, to obtain our encoding technique
and to prove the security feature of our coding scheme we prove a bivariate classical-quantum channel resolvability
lemma and a conditional classical-quantum channel resolvability lemma. As a by product of the achievability result
obtained in this work, we also obtain an achievable rate for a fully quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker channel in the absence
of Eve. The form of this achievable rate matches with its classical counterpart. The Gel’fand-Pinsker channel model
had earlier only been studied for the classical-quantum case and in the case where Alice (the sender) and Bob (the
receiver) have shared entanglement between them.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of communication over the wiretap channel was pioneered in the classical case by Wyner [3]. In
this model the wiretapper (Eve) is aware of the encoding strategy used by the transmitter (Alice) to transmit the
messages reliably to the legitimate receiver (Bob). A wiretap channel is classically modeled as a conditional probability
distribution pY Z|X , where X is the channel input supplied by Alice and (Y, Z) are the channel outputs with Y received
by Bob and Z received by Eve. The goal here is to maximize the rate of reliable message transmission from Alice
to Bob over this channel, such that Eve gets to know as little information as possible about the transmitted message.
This problem of secure communication over noisy wiretap channel was extended to the quantum domain in [4],
[5]. In the quantum case, the wiretap channel is modeled as a CPTP (completely positive and trace preserving) map
NA→BE , where A is the input register supplied by Alice and B and E represent Bob’s and Eve’s respective shares
of the channel output. The quantum wiretap channel model has also been well studied in the one-shot scenario, see
for example [6], [7], [8], [9].
Recently, there has been an interest in studying the classical wiretap channel with states. A classical wiretap channel
with states is modeled as pY Z|XS . Similar to the wiretap channel as discussed above, it produces two outputs (Y,Z)
with Y received by Bob and Z received by Eve. However, unlike the normal wiretap channel, in this case the channel
takes two inputs X (supplied by Alice) and a random parameter S. This random parameter S is used to represent
the channel state and is not controlled by the transmitter. A key motivation for studying this channel model is that it
captures the scenario of communication both in the presence of a jammer and an eavesdropper. Further, this channel
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Fig. 1. A general block diagram for communication over n independent uses of the Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel. In this model the
encoder shares n copies of the entangled state |φS′S〉 with the channel itself, where the register S′n is held by the encoder and the register
Sn is held by the channel.
also models the scenario of a memory with stuck-at faults (for more details, please see [10]). In [11], Chen and
Vinck considered the problem of communication over this channel model in the presence of an eavesdropper. They
combined the coding strategy for the normal wiretap channel along with the coding strategy for the Gel’fand-Pinsker
(GP) channel and obtained a lower bound on the secrecy capacity. In [12], Chia and El-Gamal further advanced the
theory of communication over this channel model by proposing a more sophisticated coding technique in the case
when the full channel side information is causally available at both the encoder and the decoder. Even though their
coding strategy is restricted to utilize the state information in a causal manner, the authors show that their technique
allows to achieve a better transmission rate as compared to the one obtained in [11]. The GP channel model in the
absence of Eve was first introduced by Gel’fand and Pinsker in their seminal work [13]. In this model there are two
parties (Alice and Bob) and it takes two inputs X (supplied by Alice) and a random parameter S. However, unlike
the GP-wiretap channel model this channel only produces one output Y received by Bob.
In [2] Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter revisit this communication problem when the channel state side information
is causally available at the encoder. The authors motivate this model by noting that having information about the
extra randomness S (the channel state parameter) of the channel may help in secure transmission. They employ
an encoding technique based on the superposition coding scheme [14] and obtain the best known lower bound on
the secrecy capacity of the GP channel model and also recover the results of [11] and [12] as a special case. The
converse result for this problem is not known except for some special cases (which do not seem to have natural
interpretation in the quantum case). To obtain their results, the authors prove what they call a superposition covering
lemma. Although the papers [2], [11], [12] call the approximation of the output distribution a covering lemma, this
type of approximation was studied with the name of channel resovability in the earlier papers [15], [16], [17], [7].
We study the problem of secure communication over the fully quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel and
provide an exact quantum generalization of the results obtained in [2]. Fig 1 models this communication scheme.
To derive the quantum generalization of the coding technique in [2] we prove a generalization of classical-quantum
channel resolvability lemma [7]. This lemma is the quantum analogue of the [2, Lemma 7]. To prove the secrecy
property of our coding technique we prove a conditional classical-quantum channel resolvability lemma. For the task
of designing the decoding POVMs for our protocol we use the technique of simultaneous pinching (see [18] for
details on the concept of pinching). Using this technique of simultaneous pinching we exhibit the existence of a
simultaneous decoder in the single-shot case. One key feature of the single-shot bounds derived in this manuscript
is that they are in terms of error exponent. The problem of reliable communication with no security constraint and
in the presence of entanglement assistance was first studied in [10].
The result obtained in this manuscript allows us to recover the previous known results for classical message
transmission over point-to-point quantum channels [19], [20] and the quantum wiretap channel (in the absence of
the channel state) [4], [5]. Further, our result also implies an achievable rate for classical communication over fully
quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker channel (in the absence of Eve). The form of our achievable rate for this problem is exactly
similar to that obtained in [13]. We note here that the fully quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker channel has been studied in
[10], [21] only in the case when Alice and Bob share entanglement and in [22] for classical-quantum channels. Our
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work is the first work to study this model in the absence of entanglement assistance between Alice and Bob. We
discuss these results in Corollary 1.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a finite dimensional Hilbert space H endowed with an inner product 〈·, ·〉 (in this paper, we only consider
finite dimensional Hilbert-spaces). The `1 norm of an operator X on H is ‖X‖1 := Tr
√
X†X and `2 norm is
‖X‖2 :=
√
TrXX†. A quantum state (or a density matrix or a state) is a positive semi-definite matrix on H with
trace equal to 1. It is called pure if and only if its rank is 1. A sub-normalized state is a positive semi-definite matrix
on H with trace less than or equal to 1. Let |ψ〉 be a unit vector on H, that is 〈ψ,ψ〉 = 1. With some abuse of
notation, we use ψ to represent the state and also the density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ|, associated with |ψ〉. Given a quantum
state ρ on H, support of ρ, called supp(ρ) is the subspace of H spanned by all eigen-vectors of ρ with non-zero
eigenvalues.
A quantum register A is associated with some Hilbert space HA. Define |A| := dim(HA). Let L(A) represent the
set of all linear operators on HA. Let P(A) represent the set of all positive semidefinite operators on HA. We denote
by D(A), the set of quantum states on the Hilbert space HA. State ρ with subscript A indicates ρA ∈ D(A). If two
registers A,B are associated with the same Hilbert space, we shall represent the relation by A ≡ B. Composition of
two registers A and B, denoted AB, is associated with Hilbert space HA ⊗HB . For two quantum states ρ ∈ D(A)
and σ ∈ D(B), ρ⊗σ ∈ D(AB) represents the tensor product (Kronecker product) of ρ and σ. The identity operator
on HA (and associated register A) is denoted IA.
Let ρAB ∈ D(AB). We define
ρB := TrAρAB :=
∑
i
(〈i| ⊗ IB)ρAB(|i〉 ⊗ IB),
where {|i〉}i is an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space HA. The state ρB ∈ D(B) is referred to as the marginal
state of ρAB . Unless otherwise stated, a missing register from subscript in a state will represent partial trace over
that register. Given a ρA ∈ D(A), a purification of ρA is a pure state ρAB ∈ D(AB) such that TrBρAB = ρA.
Purification of a quantum state is not unique. A quantum map E : L(A)→ L(B) is a completely positive and trace
preserving (CPTP) linear map (mapping states in D(A) to states in D(B)). A unitary operator UA : HA → HA is
such that U †AUA = UAU
†
A = IA. An isometry V : HA → HB is such that V †V = IA and V V † = IB .
Our model is given as the following pair. One is a CPTP map NAS→BE from the joint system (A,S) to the
joint system (B,E), where A is the input system, S is the channel internal system, B is the legitimate receiver
(Bob)’s system, and E is the wiretapper (Eve)’s system. The other is an entangled state |φS′S〉 across the channel
internal system S and the system S′ of side information available to the transmitter (Alice). Using the information
in S′, Alice can choose the encoder dependently of the channel internal system S. That is, the pair of a CPTP map
NAS→BE and an entangled state |φS′S〉 gives our model.
Definition 1. We shall consider the following information theoretic quantities.
1) Fidelity ([23], see also [24]) For ρA, σA ∈ D(A),
F(ρA, σA)
def
= ‖√ρA√σA‖1.
2) Purified distance ([25]) For ρA, σA ∈ D(A),
P(ρA, σA) =
√
1− F2(ρA, σA).
This is different from the Hellinger distance which is defined as
√
1− F(ρA, σA).
3) Sandwiched Re´nyi relative entropies ([26], [27]) Let ρ, σ ∈ D(A) and let α > 0 we define the following
two kinds of Re´nyi relative entropies:
D1+α(ρ‖σ) :=
1
α
log Tr(σ
− α
2(1+α) ρσ
− α
2(1+α) )1+α.
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4) Re´nyi mutual information and Re´nyi conditional mutual information ([28]) Let
ρUV B :=
∑
u,v
pUV (u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρB|u,v;
ρV−U−B :=
∑
u
pU (u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u,
where in the above ρV |u and ρB|u are appropriate marginals with respect to the state ρUV B. We define the
Re´nyi mutual information
I1+α(UV ;B)ρUVB |ρUV := minσB
D1+α(ρUV B‖ρUV ⊗ σB),
where σB is an arbitrary state on HS . Also, we define the Re´nyi conditional mutual information
I1+α(V ;B|U)ρUVB |ρUV := minσUVB D1+α(ρUV B‖σUV B), (1)
where σUV B is given with an arbitrary state σB|u as
σUV B =
∑
u
pU (u)|u〉〈u| ⊗ ρV |u ⊗ σB|u.
We will use the following facts.
Fact 1 (Minimum achieving state, [29]). For 1 +α ≥ 12 , the minimum in (1) is uniquely attained when σB|u satisfies
σB|u =
TrA[(ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u)−
α
2(1+α) ρV B|u(ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u)−
α
2(1+α) ]
Tr[(ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u)−
α
2(1+α) ρV B|u(ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u)−
α
2(1+α) ]
. (2)
Lemma 5 of [29] showed the above inequality without the classical system U . Since U is a classical system, we can
apply Lemma 5 of [29] to the state ρV B|u for each element u, which implies (2).
Fact 2 (Triangle inequality for purified distance, [30]). For states ρA, σA, τA ∈ D(A),
P(ρA, σA) ≤ P(ρA, τA) + P(τA, σA),
which implies that
P(ρA, σA)
2 ≤ (P(ρA, τA) + P(τA, σA))2 ≤ 2(P(ρA, τA)2 + P(τA, σA)2).
Fact 3 (Monotonicity under quantum operations, [31],[32]). For quantum states ρ, σ and quantum operation E(·) :
L(A)→ L(B), it holds that
D1+α(E(ρ)‖E(σ)) ≤ D1+α(ρ‖σ) and P(E(ρ), E(σ)) ≤ P(ρ, σ)
Fact 4 (Uhlmann’s Theorem, [24]). Let ρA, σA ∈ D(A). Let ρAB ∈ D(AB) be a purification of ρA and |σ〉AC ∈
D(AC) be a purification of σA. There exists an isometry V : C → B such that,
F(|θ〉〈θ|AB, |ρ〉〈ρ|AB) = F(ρA, σA),
where |θ〉AB = (IA ⊗ V )|σ〉AC .
Fact 5. For quantum states ρA, σA ∈ D(A),
F2(ρ, σ) ≥ 2−D1+α(ρ‖σ).
The fact follows from [33, Lemma 5], see also [34, Corollary 4.3,] and from the monotonicity of sandwiched Re´nyi
relative entropy.
A. ANSHU, M. HAYASHI, AND N. A. WARSI: SECURE COMMUNICATION OVER FULLY QUANTUM GEL’FAND-PINSKER WIRETAP CHANNEL5
Fact 6. Let ρ and σ be two quantum states. We have the following relation:
P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2‖ρ− σ‖1. (3)
Fact 7 ( [21]). Let ρ and σ be quantum states. Then, for every let 0 < Λ < I be an operator,
|
√
Tr [Λρ]−
√
Tr [Λσ]| ≤ P(ρ, σ).
Fact 8 (Hayashi-Nagaoka inequality, [35]). Let 0 < S < I, T be positive semi-definite operators. Then
I− (S + T )− 12S(S + T )− 12 ≤ 2(I− S) + 4T.
Fact 9 (Hayashi, [18]). Let ρ and σ be two quantum states. Further, let E be the pinching operation with respect to
the basis of σ. Then,
ρ ≤ vE(ρ),
where v represents the distinct number of eigenvalues of σ and is sometimes also called as the pinching constant.
Fact 10. (Jensen’s inequality) Let f : X → R be a concave function. Then, EX [f(X)] ≤ f(E[X]).
III. MAIN RESULT
Before giving our main result we first give the following definitions:
Definition 2. (Encoding, Decoding, Error, Secrecy) An (n,Mn, εn, δn) secrecy code for communication over a
quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel N⊗nAS→BE with channel state side information available at the encoder
(i,e, when the sender shares an entangled state |φS′S〉⊗n with the channel itself) consists of
• an encoding operation (for Alice) E : MS′n → An, where S′n ≡ Sn and |M | = Mn, such that
P (ρMEn ,TrEn [ρMEn ]⊗ TrM [ρMEn ]) ≤ δn,
where ρMEn := 1Mn
∑
m∈[1:Mn] |m〉〈m|M ⊗N⊗nAS→BE (E (m,S′n) , Sn) and P (·, ·) is the purified distance.
• a decoding operation (for Bob) D : Bn → Mˆn, with Mˆn ≡Mn. such that
Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
≤ εn
Definition 3. A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (n,Mn, εn, δn)- codes such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R;
lim sup
n→∞
εn → 0;
lim
n→∞ δn → 0.
The supremum of all the achievable rates is called the secrecy capacity of the Gel’fand-Pinsker channel.
The following theorem is one of our main result. It can be considered as the quantum generalization of the
achievability result in [2, Equations 22 and 24].
Theorem 1. Let NAS→BE be a quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel. Further, let |φ〉S′S be the shared
entanglement between the sender and the channel. We choose a joint distribution pUV and conditional states
{ρAS|u,v}u,v such that TrUV AρUV AS = TrS′φS′S , where ρUV AS :=
∑
(u,v) pUV (u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρAS|u,v.
Then, a rate R is achievable if
R ≤ Ra(ρUV AS) := min {I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ], I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S], I[UV ;B]− I[U ;S]− I[V ;E | U ]} ,
(4)
where the information theoretic quantities above are calculated with respect to the state ρUV AS .
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We denote the set of ρUV AS to satisfy the condition given in Theorem 1 by S1. Then, the rate
max
ρUVAS∈S1
Ra(ρUV AS)
is achievable. To simplify this rate, we introduce the set S2 := {ρUV AS ∈ S1|I[U ;B] − I(U ;S) ≥ 0}. Then, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
max
ρUVAS∈S1
Ra(ρUV AS) = max
ρUVAS∈S2
Ralt(ρUV AS), (5)
where
Ralt(ρUV AS) := min {I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ], I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S]} . (6)
Therefore, Theorem 1 guarantees that the rate maxρUVAS∈S2 Ralt(ρUV AS) is also achievable. The proof of this
lemma follows exactly similar to that given in [2, Appendix A]. However, we repeat the same proof in the Appendix
just for completeness.
To achieve the rate given in (4), we employ superposition coding, in which we randomly choose U and we make
an encoder with respect to V conditioned on U . Here, we elaborate upon the roles of U and V . In Gel’fand-Pinsker
wiretap channel, the register S some correlation with the systems E and B, which makes our analysis difficult. We
convert these correlations to the correlation between the register S and the message. Therefore, we need three types
of evaluations. The first one is the evaluation of the correlation between the register S and the message. The second
one is the evaluation of the decoding error probability with ignoring the correlation between the register S and the
receiver B. It can be evaluated as a correlation between U, V and S. The third one is the evaluation of the information
leakage while ignoring the correlation between the register S and the eavesdropper E. It can be evaluated as the
correlation between V and E conditioned with U .
To realize the third type of evaluation, we need a scramble variable related to V with the rate R1. This type of
analysis requires the condition
R1 > I[V ;E | U ]. (7)
In contrast, to realize the second type of analysis, we need another scramble variable related to U with the rate r as
well as the scramble variable related to V with the rate R1. This type of analysis requires the conditions
r > I[U ;S]; (8)
R1 + r > I[UV ;S]. (9)
In addition, the first type of analysis requires the condition for the coding rate R;
R+R1 + r < I[UV ;B]; (10)
R+R1 < I[V ;B | U ]. (11)
As explained in the final part of our proof, combining the conditions (7) – (11), we can show that the rate given in
(4) is achievable.
An important consequence of our achievability result is the following corollary:
Corollary 1. (a) (Communication over point-to-point channel, [19], [20]) Let NA→B be a quantum channel. Fur-
ther, let χ(N ) := maxρ I[X;B], where the maximization is over the states of the following form:
∑
x pX(x)|x〉〈x|X⊗
NA→B(ρA|x). Then every rate R satisfying the following constraint
R ≤ lim
k→∞
1
k
χ(N⊗k)
is achievable.
(b) (Communication over point-to-point wiretap channel, [4], [5]) Let NA→BE be a quantum wiretap channel.
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Further, let P (N ) := maxρ (I[X;B]− I[X;E]) , where the maximization is over the states of the following
form:
∑
x pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗NA→BE(ρA|x). Then every rate R satisfying the following constraint
R ≤ lim
k→∞
1
k
P (N⊗k)
is achievable for the wiretap channel NA→BE .
(c) (Entanglement unassisted communication over Gel’fand-Pinsker quantum channel) Let NAS→B be a Gel’fand-
Pinsker quantum channel. Further, let χ(N )GP := maxρ (I[U ;B]− I[U ;S]) , where the maximization is over
the states of the following form: ρUAS =
∑
u pUV (u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ρAS|u such that TrUAρUAS = TrS′φS′S . Then
any rate R satisfying the following constraint
R ≤ lim
k→∞
1
k
χGP(N⊗k)
is achievable for the channel NAS→B .
Proof. (a) The proof follows by setting U = ∅, V = X,S = ∅, E = ∅ in (6) and then using the coding strategy
in the proof of Theorem 1 for N⊗kA→B.
(b) The proof follows by setting U = ∅, V = X,S = ∅ in (6) and then using the coding strategy in the proof
of Theorem 1 for N⊗kA→BE .
(c) The proof follows by setting V = X,E = ∅ in (6) and then using the coding strategy in the proof of
Theorem 1 for N⊗kAS→B.
This completes the proof.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 1 we first study the single-shot version of the task mentioned in Fig 1. For the
single-shot case we obtain an error exponent like bound on the decoding error probability and the secrecy criterion.
IV. CODE CONSTRUCTION IN SINGLE-SHOT FORM
In this section, we give the construction of our code in the single-shot form, and evaluate its performance. Let
NAS→BE be a quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel. Further, let |φ〉S′S be the shared entanglement between
the sender and the channel.
Let ρUV AS be as defined in Theorem 1 and define the following states:
ρUV BE := NAS→BE(ρUV AS); (12)
ρB := TrUV ENAS→BE(ρUV AS); (13)
ρB|u :=
∑
v
pV |U (v | u)ρB|u,v. (14)
The codebook: We choose real numbers R,R1, r > 0. Let U(1), · · · , U(2r) be drawn independently according to pU .
Further, for every i ∈ [1 : 2r] and for every message m ∈ [1 : 2R], generate V (m, i, 1), · · · , V (m, i, 2R1) indepen-
dently, where for every j ∈ [1 : 2R1 ], V (m, i, j) ∼ pV |U(i). The distribution pV |U(i) is with respect to the conditional
distribution of the joint distribution pUV . In what follows we will use the notation CU := {U(1), U(2), · · · , U(2r)}
and Cm,i :=
{
V (m, i, 1), · · · , V (m, i, 2R1)}. Both CU and Cm,i for all (m, i) ∈ [1 : 2r]× [1 : 2R], are known to all
the parties involved, i.e., Alice, Bob and Eve. We will use the notation Cm := ∪iCm,i.
Remark: In the above R stands for the final rate of communication. Our encoding scheme mentioned below is a
multi-level coding scheme which has the dual feature of being a good wiretap channel code along with being a good
code for the Gel’fand-Pinsker channel. Intuitively, the coding scheme should be such that it should be able to keep the
messages secure from Eve. Further, since Bob does not have any information about S therefore the encoding scheme
should be such that it should somehow help Bob in decoding. These two features about our encoding schemes are
reflected by bounds on r and R1 derived below.
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Encoding: To define our encoder, we introduce a register C such that |ρCAS|u,v〉 is a purification of the state ρAS|u,v,
which is given in Theorem 1. Thus, we have the following purification of the state 1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j) ρS|U(i)V (m,i,j) :
|τCASIJ |U(1),···U(2r),V (m,1,1),··· ,V (m,2r,2R1 )〉 :=
1√
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
|ρCAS|U(i)V (m,i,j)〉|i〉I |j〉J . (15)
It follows from the Uhlmann’s theorem (Fact 4) that for every m ∈ [1 : 2R], there exists a set of isometries{
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm
}
such that
P
(
τCASIJ |U(1),···U(2r),V (m,1,1),··· ,V (m,2r,2R1 ),WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm
)
= P
 1
2n(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
ρS|U(i)V (m,i,j), ρS)
 , (16)
where ρS|u,v := TrAρAS|u,v. Using these notations, we define our encoder depending on the codewords in the
codebook CU and {Cm}m∈[1:2R] as follows. When Alice intends to send the message m, she applies the isometry
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm ( obtained in the derivation of (16)) on her register S
′ and transmits the register A across the channel
NAS→B.
Pinching: Our decoder will be based on the method of pinching. Therefore, before designing our decoder we first
discuss this method. Consider the following classical-quantum states
ρUV B :=
∑
u,v
pUV (u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρB|u,v; (17)
ρV−U−B :=
∑
u
pU (u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ ρV |u ⊗ ρB|u, (18)
where in the above ρV |u and ρB|u are appropriate marginals with respect to the state ρUV B.
In the subsequent discussions the main aim is to come up with completely positive and trace preserving operations
such that at the end of these operations the states ρUV B, ρUV ⊗ ρB and ρV−U−B start commuting. Towards this
we define the following operations: E1 be the pinching operation with respect to the spectral decomposition of the
state ρB. Further, for every u, let E2|u be the pinching operation with respect to the spectral decomposition of the
operator E1
(
ρB|u
)
. Then, E2 is defined as E2(ρ) :=
∑
u |u〉〈u|⊗E2|u(〈u|ρ|u〉). It easy to observe that E1(ρV−U−B),
E2 (ρUV B) and the state ρUV ⊗ ρB commute with each other. In what follows further in this section we will use
the notation v1 and v2 to represent the maximum number of components of the pinching map E1 and the maximum
number of components of the pinching maps {E2|u}u. Further, in the discussions below we will define pinching maps
E3, E4|u and E5|u, where E3 is the pinching map with respect to the the spectral basis of ρS , E4|u is the pinching
map with respect to the spectral basis of the operator E3
(
ρS|u
)
and E5|u is defined with respect to the state ρE|u.
Then, E4 and E5 are defined from E4|u and E5|u in the same way as E2. Further, let v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5 be defined
as follows:
v1 := distinct components of the pinching map E1;
v2 := maximum number of distinct components of the pinching maps {E2|u}u;
v3 := distinct components of the pinching map E3;
v4 := maximum number of distinct components of the pinching maps {E4|u}u;
v5 := maximum number of distinct components of the pinching map {E5|u}u .
(19)
Decoding: First, for two Hermitian matrices A and B, we define the projection {A ≥ B} as ∑j:λj≥0 Pj , where
the spectral decomposition of A − B is given as ∑j λjPj . In this notation, Pj is the projection to the eigenspace
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corresponding to the eigenvalue λj . Then, we define the following projectors:
ΠUV B(1) :={E2(ρUV B) ≥ 2R+R1+rρUV ⊗ ρB}, (20)
ΠUV B(2) :={E2(ρUV B) ≥ 2R+R1E1(ρV−U−B)}. (21)
Let ΠUV B := ΠUV B(1)ΠUV B(2) = ΠUV B(2)ΠUV B(1). For every (m, i, j) ∈
[
1 : 2R
]× [1 : 2r]×[1 : 2R1] define
the following operator:
γ(m, i, j) := TrUV [ΠUV B (|U(i)〉〈U(i)|U ⊗ |V (m, i, j)〉〈V (m, i, j)|V ⊗ IB)] . (22)
We now scale these operators to obtain a valid set of POVM operators as follows:
β(m, i, j) :=
 ∑
(m′,i′,j′)
γ(m′, i′, j′)
− 12 γ(m, i, j)
 ∑
(m′,i′,j′)
γ(m′, i′, j′)
− 12 . (23)
Bob uses the above set of decoding POVM operators to decode the transmitted message.
Average performance: Under the above random construction, we can evaluate the average performances. LetM be
the message which was transmitted by Alice using the strategy above and let Mˆ be the decoded message by Bob
using the decoding POVMs defined in (23). Notice that by the symmetry of the encoding and decoding strategy, it
is enough to bound Pr
{
Mˆ 6= 1|M = 1
}
. The following lemma discusses the average performance of our protocol.
Lemma 2. The average performances are evaluated with α ∈ (0, 1) as follows.
EC Pr
{
Mˆ 6= 1|M = 1
}
≤ 20
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)) + vα2 2
α(R+R1−I1−α[V ;B|U ])
)
+
2
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
, (24)
and
EC
[
P (ρME ,TrE [ρME ]⊗ TrM [ρME ])2
]
≤ 8
α
((v1
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v2
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
+
8
α
(
vα5
2αR1
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρU−V−E)
)
, (25)
where v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5 are constants defined in (19).
This lemma will be proven in Section VI. For now we assume this lemma and prove the existence of a code which
is robust to both decoding error and secrecy.
Existence of good code: Applying expurgation to this construction, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For α ∈ (0, 1) and for every R,R1, r > 0, there exists a code such that
Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
≤ 42
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)) + vα2 2
α(R+R1−I1−α[V ;B|U ])
)
+
5
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
,
and
P (ρME ,TrE [ρME ]⊗ TrM [ρME ])2 ≤20
(
1
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
+
1
α
(
vα5
2αR1
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρV−U−E)
)
,
where v,v2, v3, v4, and v5 are constants defined in (19) and the information theoretic quantities above are calculated
with respect to the state ρUV AS =
∑
(u,v) pUV (u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗|v〉〈v|V ⊗ρAS|u,v such that TrUV AρUV AS = TrSφS′S .
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Proof. We now show the existence of a code which simultaneously satisfies both the reliability and the secrecy
criterion as discussed in the Definition (2). Towards this let ε (C) and δ(C) represent the decoding error and secrecy
parameter of a random codebook C. Define the following events:
B1 := {ε(C) ≤ (1 + β)EC [ε(C)]} ; (26)
B2 := {δ(C) ≤ (1 + β)EC [δ(C)]} , (27)
where β > 1 is an arbitrary constant. From Markov’s inequality and union bound it now easily follows that
Pr {B1,B2} ≥ β − 1
β + 1
. (28)
Thus, from (24), (25), (26), (27) and setting β = 1.1 in (28) we now conclude that there exists a codebook such that:
Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
≤ 42
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)) + vα2 2
α(R+R1−I1−α[V ;B|U ])
)
+
5
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
,
and
P (ρME ,TrE [ρME ]⊗ TrM [ρME ])2 ≤20
(
1
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
+
1
α
(
vα5
2αR1
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρU−V−E)
))
.
This completes the proof.
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
A. Preparation
To analyze the asymptotic case, first we bound the number of distinct components of the pinching maps E1 and
E2 in the asymptotic and i.i.d. case. That is, we consider the case when there are n independent copies of the states
ρUV B and ρV−U−B. Let dU and dB be the dimensions of HU and HB . The lemma below gives an upper bound on
the number of distinct components of the maps E1 and E2 discussed above.
Lemma 3. Let E1 and E2 be the pinching maps as defined above. Further, let v1, v2 represent the number of distinct
components of the map E1 and E2 respectively. Then,
v1 ≤ (n+ 1)dB−1, v2 ≤ (n+ 1)dU (dB+2)(dB−1)/2.
Proof. ρ⊗nB has (n+ 1)
dB−1 eigenvalues at most. Hence, v1 ≤ (n+ 1)dB−1.
We now prove the upper bound on v2. Towards this let {|u1〉, . . . , |udU 〉} represent the basis of HU . We now focus
on the the number of components of the pinching map E2|~u, where ~u := (u1, . . . , u1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . udU , . . . , udU︸ ︷︷ ︸
ndU
). The state
ρBn|~u is written as ρ
⊗n1
B|u1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ
⊗ndB
B|udB . Then, the space H
⊗nj
B is decomposed to
H⊗njB =
⊕
λ∈Y njd
Uλ(SU)⊗ Uλ(Snj ), (29)
where Y njd is the set of indexes of size nj and depth not greater than dB . We have |Y njdB | ≤ ndB−1j and Weyl’s
dimension formula shows that dimUλ(SU) ≤ (n+ 1)dB(dB−1)/2.
We denote the pinching whose components are {Uλ(SU) ⊗ Uλ(Snj )}λ∈Y njd by Enj . The states ρB|~u and ρ
⊗n
B are
invariant with respect to En1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EndU . Therefore, E1(ρV−U−B) = E1 ◦ En1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EndB (ρV−U−B).
Now, we consider each component of En1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EndU . That is, we consider the subspace Uλ1(SU)⊗Uλ1(Sn1)⊗· · · ⊗ UλdU (SU)⊗UλdU (SndU ) = (Uλ1(SU)⊗ · · · ⊗UλdB (SU))⊗ (Uλ1(Sn1)⊗ · · · ⊗UλdU (SndU )). Both states are the
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identity on Uλ1(Sn1)⊗ · · · ⊗ UλdU (SndU ). Thus, on this subspace, the number of eigenvalues of E1(ρV−U−B) is the
dimension of Uλ1(SU)⊗· · ·⊗UλdU (SU) at most. The dimension is (n+1)dUdB(dB−1)/2 at most. Further, the number
of components of En1 ⊗· · ·⊗EndB is (n+ 1)dB(dU−1) at most. Therefore, the number of eigenvalues of E1(ρV−U−B)
is (n+ 1)dUdB(dB−1)/2(n+ 1)dU (dB−1) = (n+ 1)dU (dB+2)(dB−1)/2 at most.
Further, we have the following additivity property.
Lemma 4.
I1−α[V ;B | U ]ρ⊗nUVB |ρ⊗nUV = nI1−α[V ;B | U ]ρUVB |ρUV . (30)
Proof. Let σUV B be the state which attains the minimum in the definition of minσB D1+α(ρUV B‖ρUV (see (1)) It
then follows from the uniqueness condition that (see (2)), σ⊗nUV B satisfies the condition (2) for the n-copy case. The
statement of the lemma now follows from the uniqueness condition. Due to the uniqueness condition, we obtain
(30).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Now, we proceed to our proof for Theorem 1. From Theorem 2 it is easy to see that if the channel NAS→BE is
used n times independently, then there exists a code such that
Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
≤42
(
vα2 2
α(n(R+R1+r)−D1−α(ρ⊗nUVB‖ρ⊗nUV⊗ρ⊗nB )) + vα2 2
α
(
n(R+R1)−I1−α[V n;Bn|Un]ρ⊗n
UVB
|ρ⊗n
UV
))
+
5
α
(( v3
2nr
)α
2αD1+α(ρ
⊗n
US‖ρ⊗nU ⊗ρ⊗nS ) +
( v4
2n(R1+r)
)α
2αD1+α(ρ
⊗n
UV S‖ρ⊗nUV⊗ρ⊗nS )
)
, (31)
and
P
(
ρ⊗nME ,TrE [ρ
⊗n
ME ]⊗ TrM [ρ⊗nME ]
)2 ≤20( 1
α
(( v3
2nr
)α
2αD1+α(ρ
⊗n
US‖ρ⊗nU ⊗ρ⊗nS ) +
( v4
2n(R1+r)
)α
2αD1+α(ρ
⊗n
UV S‖ρ⊗nUV⊗ρ⊗nS )
)
+
1
α
(
vα5
2αnR1
2αD1+α(ρ
⊗n
UVE‖ρ⊗nV−U−E)
))
. (32)
Hence, using Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
≥min
(
αD1−α(ρUV B‖ρUV ⊗ ρB)− (R+R1 + r),
α
(
I1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV − (R+R1)
)
,
α
(
r −D1+α(ρUS‖ρU ⊗ ρS)
)
,
α
(
(R1 + r)−D1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV ⊗ ρS)
))
, (33)
and
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log P
(
ρ⊗nME ,TrE [ρ
⊗n
ME ]⊗ TrM [ρ⊗nME ]
)
≥min
(
α
(
r −D1+α(ρUS‖ρU ⊗ ρS)
)
,
α
(
(R1 + r)−D1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV ⊗ ρS)
)
,
α
(
R1 −D1+α (ρUV E‖ρV−U−E)
))
. (34)
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Thus, it now follows from (33), (34) that as n→∞ and α→ 0, then there exists a code such that
lim
n→∞Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}
→ 0,
lim
n→∞P
(
ρ⊗nME ,TrE [ρ
⊗n
ME ]⊗ TrM [ρ⊗nME ]
)→ 0;
if,
R+R1 + r < I[UV ;B]; (35)
R+R1 < I[V ;B | U ]; (36)
R1 + r > I[UV ;S]; (37)
r > I[U ;S]; (38)
R1 > I[V ;E | U ]. (39)
Now, for arbitrary small real numbers 1, 2, 3 > 0, we set R1 := I[V ;E | U ]+1 and r := max(I[U ;S], I[UV ;S]−
I[V ;E | U ]) + 2, which implies that R1 + r = max(I[U ;S] + I[V ;E | U ], I[UV ;S]) + 1 + 2. Then, we set
R := min(I[UV ;B]− (R1 + r), I[V ;B | U ]−R)− 3. With this choice, the aforementioned conditions are satisfied.
In this case, the rate R can be written as
R = min(I[UV ;B]− (R1 + r), I[V ;B | U ]−R)− 3
= min
(
I[UV ;B]−max(I[U ;S] + I[V ;E | U ], I[UV ;S])− 1 − 2,
I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]− 1
)
− 3
= min
(
I[UV ;B]− I[V ;E | U ]− I[U ;S]− 1 − 2,
I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S]− 1 − 2,
I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]− 1
)
− 3. (40)
Since 1, 2, 3 are arbitrary small real numbers, the rate given in (4) is achievable. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A. Error Analysis
First, we show (24) of Lemma 2. Our proof employs Lemmas 5 and 6, which are given in latter sections. Towards
this let ΘB(1) be the state received by the Bob when Alice transmits the message m = 1. Hence, it is given as
TrCEIJNAS→BE
(
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,C1 (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,C1
)
. Further, let ΘˆB(1) be defined as follows:
ΘˆB(1) :=
1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)∈[1:2r]×[1:2R1 ]
TrCENAS→BE
(
ρCAS|U(i)V (m,i,j)
)
. (41)
We now bound Pr
{
Mˆ 6= 1|M = 1
}
average over the random choice of the codebook. In what follows we will
use the notation C to denote the random choice of sequences mentioned in the codebook above. The error is now
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bounded as follows:
EC Pr
{
Mˆ 6= 1|M = 1
}
=EC
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
ΘB(1)

a≤2EC
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
 ΘˆB(1)

+ 2EC
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
√√√√√
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
ΘB(1)
−
√√√√√
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
 ΘˆB(1)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
b≤2EC
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
 ΘˆB(1)
+ 2EC [P(ΘB(1), ΘˆB(1))2] , (42)
where a follows from the generic inequality (x + y)2 ≤ 2(x2 + y2); b follows from the Fact 7 and the facts that∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l β(m
′, k, l)  I.
Using τCAS|C := 12(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)∈[1:2r]×[1:2R1 ] ρCAS|U(i)V (1,i,j) and τS|C :=
1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)∈[1:2r]×[1:2R1 ] TrCAρCAS|U(i)V (1,i,j),
we will first bound the second term in (42) as follows:
2EC
[
P(ΘˆB(1),ΘB(1))
2
]
= 2EC
[
P
(
1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)∈[1:2r]×[1:2R1 ]
TrCENAS→BE
(
ρCAS|U(i)V (m,i,j)
)
,
TrCEIJNAS→BE
(
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,C1 (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,C1
))2]
a≤ 2EC
[
P
(
τCAS|C ,WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,C1 (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,C1
)2]
b
= 2EC
[
P
(
τS|C , ρS
)2 ]
c≤ 2EC
[
1− 2αD1+α(τS|C‖ρS)
]
d≤ 2ln 2 · EC
[
D1+α
(
τS|C‖ρS
)]
e≤ 2
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
(43)
where a follows from Fact 3 with respect to the map TrCENAS→BE ; b follows from (16); c follows from Fact 5; d
follows from the following relation (44); and e follows from Lemma 6.
1− 2− xln 2 = 1− e−x ≤ x. (44)
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We now bound the first term on the R.H.S of (42) by using several steps as follows.∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
EC
[
Tr
[
β(m′, k, l)ΘˆB(1)
]]
=
1
2(R1+r)
∑
i,j
∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
EC
[
Tr
[
β
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(i)V (1,i,j)
]]
a
=
∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
EC
[
Tr
[
β
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
≤ EC
[
Tr
[
(I− β (1, 1, 1)) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
b≤ 2EC
[
Tr
[
(I− γ (1, 1, 1)) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
+ 4
∑
(m′,k,l)6=(1,1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
, (45)
where a follows from the symmetry of the code construction and b follows from the Hayashi-Nagaoka operator
inequality ( Fact 8). We now bound each of the terms on the right hand side of (45).
Consider 2EC
[
Tr
[
(I− γ (1, i, j)) ρB|U(i)V (1,i,j)
]]
:
2 · EC
[
Tr
[
(I− γ (1, i, j)) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
a
= 2 · EC
[
Tr
[
(I− TrUV [ΠUV B (|U(1)〉〈U(i)|U ⊗ |V (1, 1, 1)〉〈V (1, 1, 1)|V ⊗ I)]) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
b
= 2 · Tr [(I−ΠUV B) ρUV B]
c≤ 2 · Tr [(I−ΠUV B(1)) ρUV B] + 2Tr [(I−ΠUV B(1)) ρUV B]
d≤ 2 · vα2 2α(R+R1+r)2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB) + 2 · vα2 2α(R+R1)2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV , (46)
where a follows from the definition of γ(1, i, j) mentioned in (22); b follows from the linearity of the trace operation;
c follows from the definition of ΠUV B and the fact I−ΠUV B  I−ΠUV B(1) + I−ΠUV B(2) and d follows from
(62) and (63) proven in Lemma 5.
We now bound the second term on the right hand side of (45) as follows:
4 ·
∑
(m′,k,l)6=(1,1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
= 4 ·
∑
k 6=1
EC
[
Tr
[
γ (1, k, 1) ρB|U(1)V (1,,1,1)
]]
+ 4 ·
∑
(m′,l)6=(1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, 1, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
+ 4 ·
∑
m′ 6=1,k 6=1,l 6=1
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
. (47)
We now bound each of the terms on the right hand side of (47). Consider
∑
k 6=i EC
[
Tr
[
γ (1, k, j) ρB|U(i)V (1,i,j)
]]
:
4 ·
∑
k 6=1
EC
[
Tr
[
γ (1, k, 1) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
a
= 4 ·
∑
k 6=1
EC
[
Tr
[
TrUV [ΠUV B (|U(k)〉〈U(k)|U ⊗ |V (1, k, 1)〉〈V (1, k, 1)|V ⊗ I)] ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
b
= 4 · 2rTr [ΠUV BρUV ⊗ ρB]
c≤ 4 · 2rTr [ΠUV B(1)ρUV ⊗ ρB]
d≤ 4 · 2rvα2 2−(1−α)(R+r+R1)2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)
≤ 4 · vα2 2α((R+r+R1)−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)), (48)
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where a follows from the definition of γ(1, k, 1) mentioned in (22); b follows from the independence of the random
variables involved, linearity of trace operation, from the definition of the states ρUV and ρB and by the symmetry
of the code construction c follows because ΠUV B  ΠUV B(1) and d follows from (60) proven in Lemma 5.
We now bound the second term on the right hand side of (47) as follows:
4·
∑
(m′,l)6=(1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, 1, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
a
= 4 ·
∑
(m′,l) 6=(1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
TrUV
[
ΠUV B
(|U(1)〉〈U(1)|U ⊗ |V (m′, 1, l)〉〈V (m′, 1, l)|V ⊗ I)] ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)]]
b
= 4 · 2R+R1Tr [ΠUV BρV−U−B]
c≤ 4 · 2R+R1Tr [ΠUV B(2)ρV−U−B]
d≤ 4 · 2R+R1vα2 2−(1−α)(R+R1)2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]
= 4 · vα2 2α((R+R1)−I1−α[V ;B|U ]), (49)
where a follows from the definition of γ(m′, i, l) mentioned in (22); b follows from the independence of the random
variables involved, linearity of trace operation and from the definition of the state ρV−U−B and from the symmetry
of the code construction; c follows because ΠUV B  ΠUV B(2) d follows from (61) proven in Lemma 5.
The third term on the right hand side of (47) is bounded as follows:
4 ·
∑
m′ 6=1,k 6=1,l 6=1
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]] ≤ 4 · vα2 2α((R+r+R1)−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)). (50)
The proof for (50) follows using exactly similar steps and techniques as that used in the proof of (48).
Combining with the above discussion, we now obtain an upper bound for the first term on the R.H.S of (42);
a≤ 2EC
Tr
 ∑
(m′ 6=1),k,l
β(m′, k, l)
 ΘˆB(1)
 ,
b≤ 4EC
[
Tr
[
(I− γ (1, 1, 1)) ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
+ 8
∑
(m′,k,l)6=(1,1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
c≤ 4
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r)2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB) + vα2 2
α(R+R1)2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV
)
+ 8
∑
(m′,k,l)6=(1,1,1)
EC
[
Tr
[
γ
(
m′, k, l
)
ρB|U(1)V (1,1,1)
]]
d≤ 4
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r)2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB) + vα2 2
α(R+R1)2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV
)
+ 8
(
2 · vα2 2α(R+R1+r)2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB) + vα2 2α(R+R1)2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV
)
≤ 20
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)) + vα2 2
α(R+R1−I1−α[V ;B|U ])
)
(51)
where a follows (42); b follows from (45); c follows from (46); d follows from (47), (48), (49) and (50).
Thus, combining (42), (43) and (51), we now have the following bound on error probability:
EC Pr
{
Mˆ 6= 1∣∣M = 1}
≤ 20
(
vα2 2
α(R+R1+r−D1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB)) + vα2 2
α(R+R1−I1−α[V :B|U ])
)
+
2
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
. (52)
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Therefore, we obtain (24) of Lemma 2. In this derivation, Lemma 5 is used for the evaluation for the first term
of (42) and Lemma 6 is used for the evaluation for the second term of (42).
B. Secrecy analysis
Next, we show (25) of Lemma 2. Our proof employs Lemmas 6 and 7, which are given in latter sections. Let
ρME :=
1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R] |m〉〈m|M ⊗ ρE|m be the joint state between the register M and E. Notice that if the message
m ∈ [1 : 2R] is transmitted using the encoding strategy discussed above then the state in Eve’s possession at the end
of this transmission is the following:
ρE|m = TrB
[
NAS→BE
(
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm
)]
. (53)
We now have the following set of inequalities:
EC
[
P (ρME ,TrE [ρME ]⊗ TrM [ρME ])2
]
=EC
P
 1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρE|m,
1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
|m〉〈m| ⊗
∑
m∈[1:2R]
ρE
2
=EC
 1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
P
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρE|m, |m〉〈m| ⊗ ρE)
2
a≤ 1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
[
P
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρE|m, |m〉〈m| ⊗ ρE)2]
=
1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
[
P
(
ρE|m, ρE
)2]
b≤ 2
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
(
EC
P(ρE|m, 12r ∑
i
ρE|U(i)
)2+ EC
P(TrM [ρME ], 1
2r
∑
i
ρE|U(i)
)2)
c≤ 4
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
P(ρE|m, 12r ∑
i
ρE|U(i)
)2
d≤ 8
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
P
ρE|m, 1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)
2
+
8
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
P
 1
2r
∑
i
ρE|U(i),
1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)
2
e≤ 8
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
EC
P
ρE|m, 1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)
2
+
8
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R]
1
2r
∑
i
EC
P
ρE|U(i), 12R1 ∑
j
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)
2 (54)
where a follows from the convexity of x 7→ x2; b follows from Fact 2 (the triangle inequality for the purified
distance) and the relation that TrM [ρME ] = ρE ; c follows from the inequality P
(
TrM [ρME ],
1
2r
∑
i ρE|U(i)
) ≤
1
2R
∑
m∈[1:2R] EC
[
P
(
ρE|m, 12r
∑
i ρE|U(i)
)]
, which can be shown by the relation 12R
∑
m∈[1:2R] ρE|m = TrM [ρME ];
d follows from Fact 2; e follows from Fact 3 and convexity of square function;
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We now bound each of the terms on the right hand side of (54). Towards this consider the first term:
EC
[
P
 1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j), ρE|m
2 ]
a
=EC
[
P
(
1
2(R1+r)
∑
(i,j)∈[1:2r]×[1:2R1 ]
TrCBNAS→BE
(
ρCAS|U(i)V (m,i,j)
)
,
TrCBIJNAS→BE
(
WS
′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm (φS′S)W
†S′→ACIJ
CU ,Cm
))2]
b≤ 1
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
, (55)
where a follows from (53); b can be shown by replacing B by E in the derivation of (43).
We now bound the second term in (54) as follows:
EC
P
ρE|U(i), 12R1 ∑
j
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)
2
a≤ EC
[
1− 2(D1+α( 12R1
∑
j ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)‖ρE|U(i)))
]
c≤ ln 2 · EC
D1+α
 1
2R1
∑
j
ρE|U(i),V (m,i,j)‖ρE|U(i)

d≤ 1
α
(
vα5
2αR1
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρU−V−E)
)
, (56)
where a follows from Fact 5; b follows from the Fact 10; c follows from (44); and d follows from Lemma 7.
Thus, from (54), (55) and (56) we have the following bound:
EC
[
P (ρME ,TrE [ρME ]⊗ TrM [ρME ])2
]
≤ 8
α
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R1+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
+
8
α
(
vα5
2αR1
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρU−V−E)
)
, (57)
which implies (25). In this derivation, Lemma 6 is used for the evaluation of the first term in (54) and Lemma 7 is
used for the evaluation of the second term in (54).
VII. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
We consider hypothesis testing on three quantum systems U, V , and B. The null hypothesis is ρUV B , and the
alternative hypothesis is composed of the product state ρUV ⊗ ρB and the state ρV−U−B . To give our test, we fix
two real numbers M1 and M2 and define the following projectors:
Π1 :={E2(ρUV B) ≥ M1ρUV ⊗ ρB}, (58)
Π2 :={E2(ρUV B) ≥ M2E1(ρV−U−B)}. (59)
Since it follows from the property of the pinching operations defined above that Π1 and Π2 commute, the test
Π := Π1Π2 satisfies the properties Π ≤ Π1,Π2 and (I−Π) ≤ (I−Π1) + (I−Π2). The following lemma shows the
performance of the test Π.
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Lemma 5. For α ∈ (0, 1)
TrΠ1(ρUV ⊗ ρB) ≤ vα2M−(1−α)1 2−sD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB); (60)
TrΠ2ρU−V−B ≤ vα2M−(1−α)2 2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV ; (61)
Tr(I−Π1)ρUV B ≤ vα2Mα1 2−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB); (62)
Tr(I−Π2)ρUV B ≤ vα2Mα2 2−αI1−α[V ;B|U ]ρUVB |ρUV . (63)
Proof. We will only give the proof for (60). The proof for the other inequalities follows using exactly similar
techniques.
Notice the following set of inequalities.
Tr [(I−Π1)ρUV B]
a
=Tr [E2(I−Π1)ρUV B]
b
=Tr [(I−Π1)E2(ρUV B)]
=Tr
[
(I−Π1) (E2(ρUV B))1−α (E2(ρUV B))α
]
c≤Mα1Tr
[
(I−Π1)E2(ρUV B)1−α(ρUV ⊗ ρS)α
]
d≤Mα1Tr
[E2(ρUV B)1−α(ρUV ⊗ ρS)α]
=Mα1Tr
[(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)E2(ρUV B)(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)1−α]
=Mα1Tr
[(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)E2(ρUV B)(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)
·
(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)E2(ρUV B)(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)−α]
=Mα1Tr
[(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α) ρUV B(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)
·
(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)E2(ρUV B)(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)−α]
e≤vα2Mα1Tr
[(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α) ρUV B(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)
·
(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α) (ρUV B)(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)−α]
=vα2M
α
1Tr
(
(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α) ρUV B(ρUV ⊗ ρB)
α
2(1−α)
)1−α
=vα2M
α
1 2
−αD1−α(ρUVB‖ρUV⊗ρB), (64)
where a and b both follow from the definition of Π1 and E2 along with the fact that after applying the pinching
operation E2, (I−Π1) and E2(ρUV B) commute; c follows from the definition of Π1; d follows from the monotonicity
of the trace operation and e follows because of the Fact 9 and the operator monotonicity of the function x−α.
Here, we discuss the relation between Lemma 5 and existing results for quantum hypothesis testing. For this aim,
we consider two states ρ and σ on the single system because since existing studies mainly discuss such a case. Let
Eσ be the pinching with respect to
Πσ := {Eσ(ρ) ≥ Mσ}. (65)
Applying the same method as the proof of Lemma 5, we have
TrΠσσ ≤ vασM−(1−α)2−sD1−α(ρ‖σ);
Tr(I−Πσ)ρ ≤ vασMα2−αD1−α(ρ‖σ),
(66)
where vσ is the number of distinct eigenvalues of σ. In contrast, the paper [36] showed
TrΠσ ≤ M−(1−α)2−sD1−α(ρ‖σ);
Tr(I−Π)ρ ≤ Mα2−αD1−α(ρ‖σ), (67)
with Π := {ρ ≥ Mσ} and −αD1−α(ρ‖σ) := log Trρ1−ασα.
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Since D1−α(ρ‖σ) ≥ D1−α(ρ‖σ), the evaluation (67) is better than the evaluation (66). While the evaluation (67)
is obtained from the optimal testing Π, whose optimality is shown in [37], [38][39, Eq. (14)], the evaluation (66)
is obtained from the testing Πσ based on the pinching Eσ, which is not optimal in general. Hence, to address the
merit of the evaluation (66), we compare it with existing evaluation for the error probability of the same testing Πσ.
Before the paper [36], the paper [40] showed the following evaluation;
TrΠσσ ≤ vασM−(1−α)2−sDˆ1−α(ρ‖σ);
Tr(I−Πσ)ρ ≤ vασMα2−αDˆ1−α(ρ‖σ),
(68)
where −αDˆ1−α(ρ‖σ) := log Trρσα/2ρ−ασα/2. One might consider that we can replace Lemma 5 by the evaluation
similar to (68). However, the information processing inequality of Dˆ1−α(ρ‖σ) has not been shown. Since we employ
the information processing inequality of D1−α(ρ‖σ) for α ∈ (0, 1/2] in the latter discussion, we cannot replace
Lemma 5 by such an evaluation.
VIII. BIVARIATE CLASSICAL-QUANTUM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY LEMMA WITH ERROR EXPONENT
Lemma 6. Let ρUV S :=
∑
(u,v)∈U×V p(u, v)(u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρS|u,v be a classical-quantum state. Let,{
U(1), · · · , U(2r)}, be a set of independent and identically distributed random variables where for every i ∈
[1 : 2r], Ui ∼ pU . Further for every (i, j) ∈ [1 : 2r] × [1 : 2R], let
{
V (1, 1), · · · , V (2r, 2R)} be a collection of
independent sequences and for every (i, j), V (i, j) ∼ pV |U(i) Let C :=
{
U(1) · · ·U(2r), V (1, 1) · · ·V (2r, 2R)} and
τS|C := 12(R+r)
∑
(i,j) ρS|U(i),V (i,j). Then for α ∈ [0, 1] there exists constants v3, v4 > 0 such that,
EC
[
D1+α
(
τS|C‖ρS
)] ≤ 1
α
log2
(
EC
[
2αD1+α(τS|C‖ρS)
])
≤ 1
α ln 2
((v3
2r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
( v4
2R+r
)α
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS)
)
,
where in the above the first inequality follows because of the concavity of the log(·).
Proof. In the proof of this lemma we will need a pair of pinching maps similar to the pair E1 and E2 defined in
earlier sections. Towards this consider the following states:
ρUV S =
∑
(u,v)∈U×V
p(u, v)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρS|u,v;
ρV−U−S =
∑
u∈U
pU (u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ ρV |u ⊗ ρS|u,
where in the above ρV |u and ρS|u are appropriate marginals of the state ρUV S , and pU (u) is the marginal distribution
with respect to U . Here, the pinching operations E3 and E4 are defined in Section IV. Notice that E3 and E4 are
defined in a manner similar to E1 and E2, by replacing the system B with the system S.
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We now have the following set of inequalities:
EC
[
2αD1+α(τS|C‖ρS)
]
=ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S τS|Cρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)1+α]
=ECTr
ρ− α2(1+α)S 12(R+r) ∑
(i,j)
ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
1+α
=
1
2(R+r)
∑
(i,j)
ECTr
(ρ− α2(1+α)S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ− α2(1+α)S ) ·
ρ− α2(1+α)S 12(R+r) ∑
(i′,j′)
ρS|U(i′),V (i′,j′)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
α
=
1
2(R+r)
∑
(i,j)
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)
·
ρ− α2(1+α)S 12R+r
ρS|U(i),V (i,j) + ∑
j′ 6=j
ρS|U(i),V (i,j′) +
∑
i′ 6=i,j′ 6=j
ρS|U(i′),V (i′,j′)
 ρ− α2(1+α)S
α ]
a≤ 1
2(R+r)
∑
(i,j)
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)
·
ρ− α2(1+α)S 12R+r
ρS|U(i),V (i,j) + ∑
j′ 6=j
EV |U
[
ρS|U(i),V (i,j′)
]
+
∑
i′ 6=i,j′ 6=j
EU,V
[
ρS|U(i′),V (i′,j′)
] ρ− α2(1+α)S
α ]
b≤ 1
2(R+r)
∑
(i,j)
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
1
2R+r
(
ρS|U(i),V (i,j) + 2RρS|U(i) + 2R+rρS
)
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)α ]
c≤
∑
i,j
1
2R+r
EU(i),V (i,j)Tr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
1
2R+r
(
v4E4|U(i)(ρS|U(i),V (i,j)) + v32RE3(ρS|U(i)) + 2R+rρS
)
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)α ]
d≤
∑
i,j
1
2R+r
EU(i),V (i,j)Tr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S ρS|U(i),V (i,j)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
S
)
·
(
ρ
− α2
2(1+α)
S
1
2α(R+r)
(
vα4 (E4|U(i)(ρS|U(i),V (i,j)))α + vα3 2αR(E3(ρS|U(i)))α + 2α(R+r)ραS
)
ρ
− α2
2(1+α)
S
)]
e
=1 + EU ′,V ′Tr
[
vα4
2α(r+R)
ρS|U ′,V ′(E4|U ′(ρS|U ′,V ′))αρ−αS
]
+ EU ′,V ′Tr
[
vα3
2αr
ρS|U ′,V ′E3(ρS|U ′))αρ−αS
]
f
=1 +
vα4
2α(r+R)
Tr
[
EU ′,V ′(E4|U ′(ρS|U ′,V ′))(1+α)ρ−αS
]
+
vα3
2αr
Tr
[
EU ′(E3(ρS|U ′))(1+α)ρ−αS
]
g
≤1 + v
α
3
2αr
2αD1+α(ρUS‖ρU⊗ρS) +
vα4
2α(r+R)
2αD1+α(ρUV S‖ρUV⊗ρS),
where from step e, the variables U ′ and V ′ are subject to the joint distribution p(u, v). Here, a follows from the
fact that when j 6= j′ then the random variables (V (i, j), V (i, j′)) are independent of each other and from the
operator Jensen’s inequality; b follows from symmetry and from the definition of ρS|u and ρS ; c follows from
the Fact 9; d follows because the terms in the second terms inside the trace commute and from the fact that
(a+ b)x ≤ ax + bx(a, b > 0;x < 1); e follows from the circular and linear property of the trace operation; f follows
from the circularity of trace operation and g follows from the definition of D1+α(·‖·), the data-processing inequality
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(Fact 3), and the fact that the states involved are classical-quantum states. The desired bound now follows from the
fact that log2(1 + x) ≤ xln 2 .
IX. CONDITIONAL CLASSICAL-QUANTUM CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY LEMMA WITH ERROR EXPONENT
Lemma 7. Let ρUV E :=
∑
(u,v)∈U×V pUV (u, v)(u, v)|u〉〈u|U⊗|v〉〈v|V ⊗ρE|u,v be a classical-quantum state. Further,
let C := {U ′, V (1), · · · , V (2R)} be a collection of random variables where for every i ∈ [1 : 2R], (U ′, V (i)) ∼ pUV
and for i 6= i′, (V (i), V (i′)) ∼ pV (i)|U ′ · pV (i′)|U ′ . Consider the following state:
τE|C :=
1
2R
∑
i
ρE|U ′,V (i).
Then, for α ∈ [0, 1] there exists constant v5 > 0 such that,
EC
[
D1+α
(
τE|C‖ρE|U ′
)] ≤ 1
α
log2
(
EC
[
2αD1+α(τE|C‖ρE|U′)
])
≤ 1
α ln 2
(
vα5
2αR
2αD1+α(ρUVE‖ρV−U−E)
)
,
where in the above ρV−U−E :=
∑
u pU (u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ ρV |u ⊗ ρE|u and the first inequality is because of the concavity
of the log(·).
Proof. Let E5|u be the pinching maps with respect to the spectral decomposition of ρE|u. Further, let v5 represent
the maximum number of distinct components of the pinching map {E5|u}u.
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We now have the following inequalities:
EC
[
2αD1+α(τE|C‖ρE|U′)
]
=ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ τE|Cρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)1+α]
=ECTr
(ρ− α2(1+α)E|U ′ 12R ∑
i
ρE|U ′,V (i)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)1+α
=
1
2R
∑
i
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V (i)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
1
2R
∑
i′
ρE|U ′,V (i′)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)α]
=
1
2R
∑
i
ECTr
(ρ− α2(1+α)E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V (i)ρ− α2(1+α)E|U ′ ) ·
ρ− α2(1+α)E|U ′ 12R
ρE|U ′,V (i) +∑
i′ 6=i
ρE|U ′,V (i′)
 ρ− α2(1+α)E|U ′
α
a≤ 1
2R
∑
i
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V (i)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
1
2R
(
ρE|U ′,V (i) + 2RρE|U ′
)
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)α]
b≤ 1
2R
∑
i
ECTr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V (i)ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
1
2R
(
v5E5|U ′
(
ρE|U,V (i)
)
+ 2RρE|U ′
)
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)α]
c
=EU ′,V ′Tr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V ′ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)
·
(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
1
2R
(
v5E5|U ′
(
ρE|U ′,V ′
)
+ 2RρE|U ′
)
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)α]
d≤EU ′,V ′Tr
[(
ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′ ρE|U ′,V ′ρ
− α
2(1+α)
E|U ′
)
·
(
ρ
− α2
2(1+α)
E|U ′
1
2αR
(
vα5
(E5|U ′ (ρE|U ′,V ′))α + 2αRραE|U ′) ρ− α22(1+α)E|U ′ )]
e
=1 + EU ′,V ′Tr
[
vα5
2αR
ρE|U ′,V ′(E5|U ′(ρE|U ′,V ′))αρ−αE|U ′
]
f
=1 +
vα5
2αR
EU ′,V ′Tr
[
(E5|U ′(ρE|U ′,V ′))(1+α)ρ−αE|U ′
]
g
≤1 + v
α
5
2αR
2D1+α(ρUVE‖ρV−U−E),
where in step c, U ′, V ′ are distributed the same as U, V . Here, a follows from the fact that when i′ 6= i then the
random variables (V (i), V (i′)) ∼ pV (i)|U · pV (i′)|U and from the operator Jensen’s inequality and from the definition
of ρE|U ; b follows from Fact 9; c follows from the symmetry of C; d follows because the terms in the second terms
inside the trace is completely classical and from the fact that (a + b)x ≤ ax + bx(a, b > 0;x < 1); e follows from
the circular and linear property of the trace operation; f follows from the circularity of trace operation and g follows
from the definition of D1+α(·‖·), the data-processing inequality (Fact 3), and the fact that the states involved are
classical-quantum states. The desired bound now follows from the fact that log2(1 + x) ≤ xln 2 .
X. DISCUSSION
We have derived an achievable rate for secure communication over fully quantum Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap channel.
This rate is a natural quantum extension of the achievable rate of secure communication over Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap
channel, as given in [2]. Here, we emphasize that even in the classical case, a matching converse is known only in
a special case [2, Remark 7] and the question of finding a matching converse is still open in the general case.
Further, since our proof is based on an exponential upper bound of decoding error probability, our method has
the potential to improve the evaluation of error probabilities for various kinds of coding problems. Our method has
two key points. The first key point is the removal of the correlations between the system S and the systems B,E in
the analysis. In our method, instead of these correlations, we evaluate the correlation between the system S and the
message.
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The second key point is composed of three types of evaluations. The first is the evaluation of the decoding
error probability of super-position coding, in which the code is randomly generated by conditional distribution. This
evaluation is based on a special type of hypothesis testing on three systems, which is discussed in Section VII. The
second is the bivariate classical-quantum channel resolvability, which is given in Section VIII. We have evaluated
the quality of approximation of the average output state when the superposition coding is applied. Similar to the
evaluation in [7], our upper bound has the exponential from. The third is conditional classical-quantum channel
resolvability, which is given in Section IX. We have derived the conditional evaluation of approximation of the
average output state when the superposition coding based on pUV is applied. Here, we take the condition for the
choice of V . Similar to the above case, our upper bound also has the exponential form. Combining the first and
second types of evaluations, we have analyzed the decoding error probability of our code for our main problem.
Further, combining the second and third types of evaluations, we have evaluated the secrecy of our code.
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APPENDIX
Here we show Lemma 1 by following 7 steps.
Step 1: Analysis of easy case.
We first prove that maxρUVAS∈S1 Ra(ρUV AS) ≥ maxρUVAS∈S2 Ralt(ρUV AS). For ρUV AS ∈ S2, the inequality
I[UV ;B] − I[U ;S] − I[V ;E | U ] ≥ I[V ;B | U ] − I[V ;E | U ] follows from I[UV ;B] − I[U ;S] − I[V ;E | U ] =
I[V ;B | U ] − I[V ;E | U ] + I[U ;B] − I[U ;S] and the assumption I[U ;B] − I[U ;S] ≥ 0. Hence, Ra(ρUV AS) =
Ralt(ρUV AS). Thus, maxρUVAS∈S1 Ra(ρUV AS) ≥ maxρUVAS∈S2 Ra(ρUV AS) = maxρUVAS∈S2 Ralt(ρUV AS).
We now prove the opposite inequality
max
ρUVAS∈S2
Ralt(ρUV AS) ≥ max
ρUVAS∈S1
Ra(ρUV AS). (69)
Let ρ?UV AS be a state such that Ra(ρ
?
UV AS) = maxρUVAS∈S1 Ra(ρUV AS) > 0, (if Ra ≤ 0 then the bound is trivial
to prove). If the state ρ?UV AS satisfies the inequality I[U ;B] − I[U ;S] > 0, we have maxρUVAS∈S1 Ra(ρUV AS) =
Ra(ρ
?
UV AS) ≤ Ralt(ρ?UV AS) ≤ maxρUVAS∈S2 Ralt(ρUV AS). Thus, the inequality of interest holds.
Step 2: Main part.
We show (69) when ρ?UV AS satisfies the opposite inequality, i.e.,
I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] ≤ 0. (70)
For this aim, we introduce the variable V˜ as the output of the erasure channel of erasure probability ε ∈ [0, 1] with
the input variable V . Using the transition probability pV˜ |V of the erasure channel with erasure probability ε, we
define the variables U ′ := (U, V˜ ), V ′ := V , and the following classical-quantum state:
ρUV V˜ U ′V ′AS :=
∑
(u,v)
pUV (u, v)pV˜ |V (v˜ | v)δ{U ′=(U,V˜ ),V ′=V }|u〉〈u|U⊗|v〉〈v|V⊗|u′〉〈u′|U ′⊗|v′〉〈v′|V ′⊗|v˜〉〈v˜|V˜⊗ρ?AS|u,v.
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In what follows all the calculations would be with respect to the state ρUV V˜ U ′V ′AS and the channel NAS→BE . Hence,
the state TrUV V˜ [ρUV V˜ U ′V ′AS ] is a valid state for Ralt. As shown later (Step 3), there exists an ε ∈ (0, 1) such that
I[U ′;B]− I[U ′;S] = 0 (71)
I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] + (1− ε) (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;S | U ]) = 0. (72)
Then, we choose such an ε ∈ [0, 1]. Also, as shown later (Steps 4 and 5), we have
I[U ′V ′;B]− I[U ′V ′;S] ≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS) (73)
I[V ′;B | U ′]− I[V ′;E | U ′] ≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS). (74)
Hence, considering the definition of Ralt(TrUV V˜ [ρUV V˜ U ′V ′AS ]), we obtain (69) as
max
ρUVAS∈S2
Ralt(ρUV AS) ≥ Ralt(TrUV V˜ [ρUV V˜ U ′V ′AS ])
≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS) = max
ρUVAS∈S1
Ra(ρUV AS).
Step 3: Existence of ε satisfying (71) and (72).
Now, we show that there exists an ε ∈ [0, 1] satisfying (71) and (72). We find
I[U ′;B]− I[U ′;S] = I[UV˜ ;B]− I[UV˜ ;S]
= I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] + I[V˜ ;B | U ]− I[V˜ ;S | U ]
= I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] + (1− ε) (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;S | U ]) . (75)
Notice that in the above if ε = 1 then I[U ′;B] − I[U ′;S] < 0, this follows from the assumption that I[U ;B] −
I[U ;S] < 0. On the other hand if ε = 0 then I[U ′;B] − I[U ′;S] = I[UV ;B] − I[UV ;S]. Our assumption that
Ra(ρ
?
UV AS) > 0 guarantees that I[UV ;B] − I[UV ;S] > 0. Thus, I[U ′;B] − I[U ′;S] > 0. Hence, we can choose
an ε ∈ [0, 1] such that I[U ′;B]− I[U ′;S] = 0, i.e., (71), which implies (72).
Step 4: Proof of (73).
Since V˜ is obtained by passing V through an erasure channel, we have I[UV V˜ ;B] = I[UV ;B] and I[UV V˜ ;S] =
I[UV ;S]. Hence, we can show (73) as follows:
I[U ′V ′;B]− I[U ′V ′;S] = I[UV V˜ ;B]− I[UV V˜ ;S]
= I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S]
a≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS), (76)
where a follows from the definition of Ra(ρ?UV AS).
Step 5: Proof of (74).
Since V˜ is the output of the erasure channel of erasure probability ε with the input random variable V , we have
I[V˜ ;B | U ] = (1− ε)I[V ;B | U ] and I[V˜ ;E | U ] = (1− ε)I[V ;E | U ]. Hence, we can show (74) as follows:
I[V ′;B | U ′]− I[V ′;E | U ′] = I[V ′;B | UV˜ ]− I[V ′;E | UV˜ ]
a
= I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]−
(
I[V˜ ;B | U ]− I[V˜ ;E | U ]
)
= I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]− (1− ε) (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ])
= ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]) , (77)
where a follows from the chain rule of mutual information. Using exactly similar steps we can prove that
I[V ′;B | U ′]− I[V ′;S | U ′] = ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;S | U ]) . (78)
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As shown later (Steps 6 and 7), using (78), we have
ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]) ≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS). (79)
Hence, we obtain (74).
Step 6: Proof of (79) in First case.
We show (79) when
I[V ;S | U ] ≥ I[V ;E | U ]. (80)
We have the following set of inequalities:
ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]) a≥ ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;S | U ])
b
= I[V ′;B | U ′]− I[V ′;S | U ′]
c
= I[U ′V ′;B]− I[U ′V ′;S]
d≥ Ra(ρ?UV AS), (81)
where a follows from (80); b follows from (78); c follows from (71) and d follows from (73). Hence, we have (79).
Step 7: Proof of (79) in Second case.
We show (79) when
I[V ;S | U ] < I[V ;E | U ]. (82)
The assumption I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] ≤ 0 (see (70)) implies that
I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ] + I[U ;B]− I[U ;S] ≤ I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]. (83)
The assumption I[V ;S | U ] < I[V ;E | U ] (see (82)) implies that
I[UV ;B]− I[U ;S]− I[V ;E | U ] < I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S]. (84)
Using the chain rule, we have
I[UV ;B]− I[U ;S]− I[V ;E | U ] = I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ] + I[U ;B]− I[U ;S]. (85)
Combining (83), (84), and (85), we have
I[UV ;B]− I[U ;S]− I[V ;E | U ] ≤ min{I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ], I[UV ;B]− I[UV ;S]}. (86)
Hence, the minimum Ra(ρ?UV AS) is given as
Ra(ρ
?
UV AS) = I[UV ;B]− I[U ;S]− I[V ;E | U ]. (87)
Now, we have the following set of inequalities:
ε (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]) = I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]− (1− ε) (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ])
a
> I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ]− (1− ε) (I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;S | U ])
b
= I[V ;B | U ]− I[V ;E | U ] + I(U ;B)− I(U ;S)
c
= Ra(ρ
?
UV AS), (88)
where a follows from the assumption that I[V ;S | U ] < I[V ;E | U ] (see (82)); b follows from (72) and c follows
from (87). Hence, we obtain (79). This completes the proof.
